期刊名称:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN:0027-8424
电子版ISSN:1091-6490
出版年度:2016
卷号:113
期号:43
页码:12099-12104
DOI:10.1073/pnas.1511273113
语种:English
出版社:The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要:Strong social capital is increasingly recognized as an organizational advantage. Better knowledge sharing and reduced transaction costs increase work efficiency. To mimic the formation of the associated communication network, we propose the Expert Game, where each individual must find a specific expert and receive her help. Participants act in an impersonal environment and under time constraints that provide short-term incentives for noncooperative behavior. Despite these constraints, we observe cooperation between individuals and the self-organization of a sustained trust network, which facilitates efficient communication channels with increased information flow. We build a behavioral model that explains the experimental dynamics. Analysis of the model reveals an exploitation protection mechanism and measurable social capital, which quantitatively describe the economic utility of trust.
关键词:social capital ; cooperation evolution ; communication network ; experimental economics ; game theory