文章基本信息

标题：Market equilibrium of the agricultural product target price insurance and its moral hazard premium
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作者：Zhao L. ; Mu Y. ; Song B. 等
期刊名称：Agricultural Economics
印刷版ISSN：0139-570X
电子版ISSN：1805-9295
出版年度：2016
卷号：62
期号：5
页码：215-224
DOI：10.17221/120/2015-AGRICECON
出版社：Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences
摘要：In the study, an expected revenue model was built for the farmers and insurance institutes in China, with the aim of researching the realization conditions of the target price insurance market equilibrium; analysing the reasons and consequences of the moral hazards; obtaining a paradox and elaborating the reason; measuring the moral hazard premium and researching positions, as well as the role of government in the target price premium; and also discussing the relationship between the target price and the cost price. The conclusions found were that the market risk was the major risk in agriculture; the target price insurance implementation relies on the government subsidy, which shall be equivalent to the sum of the farmers’ moral hazard premium and social costs; the moral hazard premium has a negative externality; the insurance companies are also the beneficiaries of the farmers’ moral hazard; and the best target price should be smaller than the total cost price of the agricultural products.
关键词：target price; agricultural insurance; moral hazard premium; perspective of institutional economics