文章基本信息

标题：Friendly Precedent
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作者：Niblett, Anthony ; Yoon, Albert H.
期刊名称：William & Mary Law Review
印刷版ISSN：0043-5589
电子版ISSN：2374-8524
出版年度：2016
卷号：57
期号：5
页码：1789
出版社：College of William & Mary Law School
摘要：This Article explores which legal precedents judges choose to support their decisions.When describing the legal landscape in a written opinion, which precedent do judges gravitate toward? We examine the idea that judges are more likely to cite friendly precedent. A friendly precedent, here, is one that was delivered by Supreme Court Justices who have similar political preferences to the lower court judges delivering the opinion. In this Article, we test whether a federal Court of Appeals panel is more likely to engage with binding Supreme Court precedent when the political flavor of that precedent is aligned with the political composition of the panel. We construct a unique dataset of 591,936 citations to United States Supreme Court decisions by the federal Courts of Appeals in 127,668 unanimous decisions from 1971 to 2007. We find that judges gravitate toward friendly precedent. The political composition of a panel consistently influences which binding precedent is cited in the written opinion. All Republican-appointed panels gravitate toward the most conservative precedent; all Democratic-appointed panels gravitate toward the most liberal precedent and unfavorably cite the most conservative precedent. This result is notable because it provides strong evidence that judges, when reasoning their decisions, have different conceptions of binding precedent.
关键词：Judges; Precedents; Courts; Judicial Process; Politics; Law and Economics