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标题：How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility
其他标题：How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility
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作者：Hiller, Fernando Rudy ; Hiller, Fernando Rudy
期刊名称：Manuscrito
印刷版ISSN：0100-6045
出版年度：2016
期号：AHEAD
页码：0-0
DOI：10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.FRH
出版社：UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
摘要：Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds.
其他摘要：Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds.
其他关键词：control;fair opportunity;reasons-responsiveness;responsibility;moral luck;Nagel