文章基本信息

标题：Empty Creditors and Debt Exchanges
本地全文：下载
作者：Hemel, Daniel
期刊名称：Yale Journal on Regulation
印刷版ISSN：0741-9457
出版年度：2010
卷号：27
期号：1
页码：6
出版社：Yale Law School
摘要：This Comment reviews recent proposals to address the "empty creditor" problem. The author argues that previous proposals would do little to reduce the risk that empty creditors will block debt-for-equity exchanges in order to collect credit default swap payments. The author presents an alternative approach that would limit the dangers of empty crediting by modifying the standardized language of swap agreements. Specifically, the author argues for widening the definition of "credit events" to encompass voluntary debt for- equity exchanges that surpass a certain participation threshold. This reform would benefit the vast majority of credit protection buyers and sellers, while simultaneously reducing deadweight losses resulting from unnecessary bankruptcy filings.