文章基本信息

标题：The Use of Non-Verifiable Information Regarding the Agent’s Action in Compensation Contracts
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作者：Pattarin Adithipyangkul
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2016
卷号：06
期号：02
页码：234-245
DOI：10.4236/tel.2016.62026
语种：English
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：Subjective, non-verifiable information (such as satisfaction rating) is often used to supplement objective, verifiable information (such as financial numbers) in contracting. Empirical research finds that non-verifiable information can be used in contracting as a subjective performance measure or as subjective weighting on an objective performance measure. The differences between the two options have not yet been thoroughly explored analytically. This paper considers a multi-task setting where the non-verifiable performance signal provides incremental information about an aspect of the agent’s action. The research finds that when the agent has unlimited liability, both contracting schemes deliver the same payoff to the principal. However, the principal may strictly prefer a subjective weighting scheme in a setting where the agent has limited liability.
关键词：Subjective Performance Evaluation;Implicit Contract;Non-Verifiable Information