文章基本信息

标题：Does Inside Trading Affect Managers’ Decision-Making? A Theoretical Investigation
本地全文：下载
作者：Ning Cao ; Shanmin Li ; Yong Li 等
期刊名称：Journal of Mathematical Finance
印刷版ISSN：2162-2434
电子版ISSN：2162-2442
出版年度：2015
卷号：05
期号：04
页码：348-359
DOI：10.4236/jmf.2015.54030
语种：English
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：This paper analyzes how inside trading affects managers’ decision-making and also examines the effect of the social relations on managers. Through model analysis, the paper shows that inside trading does affect managers’ behavior. Inside trading lowers the managers’ minimum requirements for risky projects and thus has a risk-reduction effect on managers. In some cases, the existence of inside trading makes managers select projects with negative returns, which results in agency problems. When managers try to consolidate their social networks by divulging inside information, agency problems are exacerbated. This paper also analyzes the degree of risk aversion. As the degree of a manager’s risk aversion increases, the risk-reduction effect of inside trading is reduced.
关键词：Insider Trading;Risk Aversion;Agency Problem