文章基本信息

标题：The Economics of Bargaining between Manufacturers and Retailers: When Do Slotting Fees Arise?
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作者：Jean Paul Chavas
期刊名称：International Journal of Advances in Management and Economics
印刷版ISSN：2278-3369
出版年度：2012
卷号：1
期号：4
出版社：International Journal of Advances in Management and Economics
摘要：This paper investigates when do slotting fees arise as outcomes of the bargaining process between manufacturers and retailers. An asymmetric Nash bargaining model is used to investigate the economics of slotting fees obtained from bilateral negotiations about two-part tariff contracts. The analysis applies to an arbitrary number of manufacturers and retailers, and holds under general technology and product differentiation conditions. We show how scale economies in retail revenue and complementarity contribute to the existence of slotting fees. Such results apply irrespective of the retailer bargaining power. They indicate that observed variations in the existence and magnitude of slotting fees across products and market conditions are driven by variations in complementarity and economies of scale in retail revenue.