文章基本信息

标题：Reputation incentive or economic incentive? An empirical study on job-hopping behavior of independent directors
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作者：Fan Zhou ; Jinsong Tan ; Yuyin Jian 等
期刊名称：Frontiers of Business Research in China
印刷版ISSN：1673-7326
电子版ISSN：1673-7431
出版年度：2009
卷号：3
期号：3
页码：393-412
DOI：10.1007/s11782-009-0019-x
出版社：Higher Education Press, co-published with Springer-Verlag GmbH
摘要：This paper analyzes the real motivations behind independent directors’ (IDs) job-hopping behavior based on 75 cases from 2001 to 2005. Relevant extant literature is reviewed and an analytical framework based on reputation incentive mechanism (such as company reputation, a company’s position in the hierarchy of Chinese firms’ administrative reporting relationships, and job risks) and economic incentive mechanism (including IDs’ remunerations and HR costs) have been put forward. Results show that reputation-related factors, such as a listed company’s reputation and job risks, are the main influencing factors of IDs’ job-hopping behavior. This finding indicates that sole emphasis on IDs’ remunerations may not able to motivate IDs effectively and the reputation mechanism is more effective in motivating IDs. Contributions of this paper include enrichment of the extant literature on corporate governance from a brand-new perspective and provision of empirical evidence for further improvement in the incentive mechanisms for IDs.
关键词：Independent directors; job selection; economic incentive; reputation incentive
其他关键词：独立董事，任职选择，经济收益，声誉激励