文章基本信息

标题：AMBIGUITY BETWEEN PIRATE INCENTIVE AND COLLECTIVE DESIRABILITY WITHIN SEMI-DELEGATION PATTERN
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作者：ZHAO, KAI ; WU, WANSHU
期刊名称：Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics
印刷版ISSN：0018-280X
出版年度：2015
卷号：56
期号：2
页码：259-279
出版社：Maruzen Company Ltd
摘要：This paper extends the literature on strategic delegation to a model with a semi-delegation structure. We investigate how the level of spillovers and the degree of product di.erentiation a.ect the owner.s decision. It is found that owners face a prisoner.s dilemma when the spillover is very small or when the products are su.ciently di.erentiated. Concerning behavior, managers act less aggressively in the pure market, where there are delegated-firms, than in the mixed market, where entrepreneurial and managerial firms co-exist. Furthermore, we highlight the existence of ambiguous areas where delegations make firms profitable, but unable to generate desirable welfare.
关键词：incentive scheme; product di.erentiation; R&D spillover; semi-delegation