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标题：Contagious herding and endogenous network formation in financial networks
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作者：Co-Pierre Georg
期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2014
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：When banks choose similar investment strategies, the nancialsystem becomes vulnerable to common shocks. Banks decide abouttheir investment strategy ex-ante based on a private belief about thestate of the world and a social belief formed from observing the ac-tions of peers. When the social belief is strong and the nancialnetwork is fragmented, banks follow their peers and their investmentstrategies synchronize. This eect is stronger for less informative pri-vate signals. For endogenously formed interbank networks, however,less informative signals lead to higher network density and less syn-chronization. It is shown that the former eect dominates the latter.
关键词：social learning; endogenous nancial networks; mult;agent simulations; systemic risk