文章基本信息

标题：Understanding bank-run contagion
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作者：Martin Brown ; Stefan T. Trautmann ; Razvan Vlahu 等
期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2014
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：We study experimental coordination games to examine through whichtransmission channels, and under which information conditions, a panic-based depositor-runat one bank may trigger a panic-based depositor-run at another bank. We find thatwithdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players’ beliefsthat other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them more likely to withdrawas well. Importantly though, observed withdrawals affect depositors’ beliefs, and are thuscontagious, only when depositors know that there are economic linkages between their bankand the observed bank
关键词：Contagion; Bank runs; Systemic risk