期刊名称:Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN:0804-6824
出版年度:2015
卷号:2015
出版社:Bergen
摘要:In this paper we study the e¤ect of reference pricing on pharmaceutical prices and ex-penditures when generic entry is endogenously determined. We develop a Salop-type modelwhere a brand-name producer competes with generic producers in terms of prices. In themarket there are two types of consumers: (i) brand biased consumers who choose betweenbrand-name and generic drugs, and (ii) brand neutral consumers who choose between thedi¤erent generic drugs. We nd that, for a given number of rms, reference pricing leadsto lower prices of all products and higher brand-name market shares compared with a re-imbursement scheme based on simple coinsurance. Thus, in a free entry equilibrium, thenumber of generics is lower under reference pricing than under coinsurance, implying thatthe net e¤ects of reference pricing on prices and expenditures are ambiguous. Allowing forprice cap regulation, we show that the negative e¤ect on generic entry can be reversed, andthat reference pricing is more likely to result in cost savings than under free pricing. Our re-sults shed light on the mixed empirical evidence on the e¤ects of reference pricing on genericentry.