文章基本信息

标题：Do Treatment Decisions Depend on Physicians Financial Incentives?
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作者：Kurt R. Brekke ; Tor Helge Holmås ; Karin Monstad 等
期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2015
卷号：2015
出版社：Bergen
摘要：We study whether and how physicians respond to nancial incentives, making use ofdetailed register data on the health-care services provided to patients by general practitioners(GPs) in Norway over a six-year period (2006-11). To identify GPstreatment responses,we exploit that specialisation in general medicine entitles the GPs to a higher consultationfee, implying a change in total and relative fee payments. To control for demand and supplyfactors related to becoming a specialist, we estimate a GP xed e¤ect model focusing on anarrow time window around the date of specialist certication. Our results show a sharpresponse by the GPs immediately after obtaining specialist certication and thus a higherconsultation fee: the number of visits increase, while the treatment intensity (prolongedconsultations, lab tests, medical procedures) decline. These ndings are consistent with atheory model where (partly) prot-motivated GPs face excess demand and income e¤ectsare su¢ ciently small. Finally, we nd no evidence for adverse health e¤ects (measured byemergency care centre visits) on patients due to the change in GPs treatment behaviourafter becoming a specialist.
关键词：General Practitioners; Fee-for-service; Prot-motivation