期刊名称:Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN:0804-6824
出版年度:2014
卷号:2014
出版社:Bergen
摘要:This paper studies the e¤ects of price regulation and parallel imports in the on-patent pharmaceutical market. First, we develop a theory model in which a pharmacynegotiates producer prices with a brand-name rm and then sets retail prices. We showthat the e¤ects of price regulation crucially depend on whether the producer facescompetition from parallel imports. While parallel imports improve the bargainingposition of the pharmacy, price regulation counteracts this e¤ect and may even bepro table for the producer. Second, we use a unique dataset with information onsales and prices at both producer and retail level for 165 substances over four years(2004-7). Exploiting exogenous variation in the regulated price caps, we show thatstricter price regulation reduces competition from parallel imports. While the e¤ectis clearly negative on producer pro ts for substances without parallel imports, thee¤ect is not signi cant for substances with parallel imports. Finally, we show thatstricter price regulation reduces total expenditures, but the e¤ect is much stronger forsubstances with parallel import. Thus, our results suggest that price regulation maypromote both static and dynamic e¢ ciency in the presence of parallel imports.