文章基本信息

标题：Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?
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作者：Andreea Cosnita-Langlais ; Lars Sørgard
期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2014
卷号：2014
出版社：Bergen
摘要：This paper deals with the enforcement of merger policy, and aims to study how mergerremedies a¤ect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine theoptimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and identify situations wherethe introduction of remedies can lead to a lower welfare. We nd that the potential forremedies can make it less likely that the worst mergers are deterred. Even if the worstmergers are deterred, the potential for remedies can lead to more mergers with a negativeimpact to be proposed, and eventually to more decision errors by the antitrust authorities.
关键词：merger control; merger remedies; enforcement; deterrence