文章基本信息

标题：Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games
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作者：Adrian de Groot Ruiz ; Theo Offerman ; Sander Onderstal 等
期刊名称：CREED Working Papers / Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making
出版年度：2015
出版社：Amsterdam
摘要：In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria incheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussionof how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talkgames. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measurethat is intended to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talkgames. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC),the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and size ofcredible deviations. ACDC organizes the results from several cheap talkexperiments in which behavior converged to equilibrium, even in caseswhere other criteria do not make a prediction
关键词：cheap talk; neologism proofness; credible deviation; refinement;ACDC; experiment