期刊名称:CREED Working Papers / Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making
出版年度:2014
出版社:Amsterdam
摘要:There are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions bycommittee voting, with each group represented by a single person. Theoretical conceptssuggest how voting systems for such committees should be designed. Theseabstract rules can usually not be implemented perfectly, however. In this paper Iaddress two very closely related problems. The first one is called the inverse powerproblem: the problem of finding voting systems that approximate the theoreticalrules as best as possible. The second problem is how to measure the unequalnessof a voting system. I propose a new method to address both problems, based onthe coefficient of variation, and show why it should be preferred to other methods
关键词:inverse power problem; indirect voting power; measuring inequality; committee;voting; assembly of representatives