文章基本信息

标题：for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation
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作者：Boris van Leeuwen ; Theo Offerman ; Arthur Schram 等
期刊名称：CREED Working Papers / Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making
出版年度：2014
出版社：Amsterdam
摘要：We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in anetwork formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player torealize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematicallyexamine the effects of group size and status rents. The experimental results provide very clearsupport for a competition for status dynamic that predicts when, and if so which, repeatedgame equilibrium is reached. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that thesupergame effects we observe are driven by social preferences
关键词：Network formation; public goods; competition; status