摘要:Spanish institutions and researchers have made a great effort to know the level of use of governance mechanisms of listed companies. However, there are still little known areas of this system. In this sense, the work analyzes the presence of shareholders coalitions in the Spanish stock market in the period 2003-2009. The results show the presence of these contracts in about one in four listed companies, linking to such agreements at around 42% of the voting rights. Moreover, the results show a greater presence of shareholders coalitions in large-cap companies, in the greater concentration of ownership companies, in firms without defensive measures and in the pyramid structures.
其他摘要:Spanish institutions and researchers have made a great effort to know the level of use of governance mechanisms of listed companies. However, there are still little known areas of this system. In this sense, the work analyzes the presence of shareholders coalitions in the Spanish stock market in the period 2003-2009. The results show the presence of these contracts in about one in four listed companies, linking to such agreements at around 42% of the voting rights. Moreover, the results show a greater presence of shareholders coalitions in large-cap companies, in the greater concentration of ownership companies, in firms without defensive measures and in the pyramid structures.