文章基本信息

标题：Public goods and decay in networks
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作者：Enrique Fatas ; Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez ; Antonio J. Morales 等
期刊名称：SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association
印刷版ISSN：1869-4187
电子版ISSN：1869-4195
出版年度：2015
卷号：6
期号：1
页码：73-90
DOI：10.1007/s13209-014-0114-x
出版社：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
摘要：We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.
关键词：Public good ;Networks ;Decay ;H41 ;C92