文章基本信息

标题：Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis
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作者：Kollmann, Andrea ; Schneider, Friedrich
期刊名称：Sustainability
印刷版ISSN：2071-1050
出版年度：2010
卷号：2
期号：12
页码：3710-3734
出版社：MDPI, Open Access Journal
摘要：There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them.
关键词：public choice and environmental policies; sustainability; voters; government; interest groups; tradable permits; green taxes [D23; D62; D72; D73; H23; Q57; Q58]