文章基本信息

标题：Matching to share risk
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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-André ; Reny, Philip J.
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2015
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (\textquotedblleft males\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblleft females\textquotedblright ) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits non transferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched couples, the more risk averse male is matched with the less risk averse female.
关键词：Negatively assortative matching; risk-sharing; stable match