摘要:In the last twenty years, not for profit governance concerns have unleashed a flood of theoretical research and private initiatives. The aim is to clarify the role of boards in the supervision of not for profit activities. However, those studies don't enquire about the relationship between non profit governance and efficiency. Following this far-reaching analysis in a very relevant sample of Spanish nonprofits -the Non Governmental Organizations for Development-, we hesitate to argue that boards are good instruments to guarantee non- profits performance and the achievement of their mission. Moreover, we demonstrate that institutional donors (AECI) are an alternative mechanism for non profit control. This worrying situation requires to strengthen and to restructure the boards of NGDO
其他摘要:In the last twenty years, not for profit governance concerns have unleashed a flood of theoretical researchand private initiatives. The aim is to clarify the role of boards in the supervision of not for profit activities.However, those studies don't enquire about the relationship between non profit governance and efficiency.Following this far-reaching analysis in a very relevant sample of Spanish nonprofits -the Non GovernmentalOrganizations for Development-, we hesitate to argue that boards are good instruments to guarantee non-profits performance and the achievement of their mission. Moreover, we demonstrate that institutionaldonors (AECI) are an alternative mechanism for non profit control. This worrying situation requires tostrengthen and to restructure the boards of NGDO