文章基本信息

标题：Multiple Principal-Agent Model of SMEs Pollution Regulation under Centralized Treatment
本地全文：下载
作者：Li, Yuyu ; Huang, Bo
期刊名称：Journal of Networks
印刷版ISSN：1796-2056
出版年度：2013
卷号：8
期号：9
页码：2063-2070
DOI：10.4304/jnw.8.9.2063-2070
语种：English
出版社：Academy Publisher
摘要：In this paper, a pollution regulation game model under multiple principal-agent among government, pollutant treatment enterprise and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is developed to study the pollution regulation mechanism under centralized treatment mode. The optimal regulation mechanism is obtained through theoretic and numeric analysis. It is found that with the supervision costs on pollutant emission, government can not achieve the optimal social welfare but the sub-optimal through supervision and regulation; government should charge a fine as big as possible on pollutant treatment enterprise instead of SMEs to reduce the emission of untreated pollutants, and guide the price-making of pollutant treatment enterprise instead of making by itself freely, in order to increase social welfare.
关键词：Pollution Regulation;Incentive Mechanism;Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs);Multiple Principal-Agent;Centralized Treatment