文章基本信息

标题：Conquering Credibility for Monetary Policy under Sticky Confidence
本地全文：下载
作者：Jaylson Jair da Silveira ; Gilberto Tadeu Lima
期刊名称：Revista Brasileira de Economia
印刷版ISSN：0034-7140
出版年度：2015
卷号：69
期号：2
页码：251-261
语种：English
出版社：Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
摘要：We derive a best-reply monetary policy when the confidence by price setters on the monetary authority’s commitment to price level targeting is both incomplete and sticky. We find that complete confidence (or full credibility) is not a necessary condition for reaching a price level target. In fact, it is the reaching of a price level target for long enough that rather ensures the conquering of the greatest possible confidence. Evidently, this result has relevant implications for the conduct of monetary policy in pursuit of price stability.
关键词：price level targeting;best-reply monetary policy;sticky confidence;evolutionary game.