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标题：Euro-Japanese Relations in the ‘Year of Europe’, 1973-74.
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作者：Takeshi YAMAMOTO
期刊名称：日本EU学会年報
印刷版ISSN：1884-3123
电子版ISSN：1884-2739
出版年度：2012
卷号：2012
期号：32
页码：158-177
DOI：10.5135/eusj.2012.158
出版社：The European Union Studies Association-Japan
摘要：Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor, proposed to renew the Atlantic relations in 1973: the year was called the “Year of Europe”. Interestingly, Dr. Kissinger suggested including Japan in this proposal as well. This was because the US government considered that Japan, which had recently normalized diplomatic relations with China, should have a greater connection to Western powers during an era of détente. From the outset, the reactions of EC countries to the Kissinger proposal were negative. They disliked, in particular, the US strategy of linking defence, trade and monetary matters into “one ball of wax”. The Japanese government was also initially surprised by Kissinger’s call, but responded to it positively. However, Japan made it clear that Japan could not participate in defence co-operation at the same level of NATO because of its constitutional restrictions. It is clear that the US and Japan wanted to produce a US-EC-Japan trilateral declaration, but the EC opposed it. France, in particular, refused it strongly, because, according to the French, it represented a triangle that placed America at the top. Paris feared the possibility of Washington’s predominance through such a declaration. Therefore, the EC made a counter-proposal for Japan to draft an EC-Japan bilateral declaration. European leaders considered that Japan was important in world affairs. They therefore offered the idea of a series of bilateral declarations between the EC-US, the US-Japan, and the EC-Japan. Dr. Kissinger was angry at the EC’s manoeuvres. Initially, the Japanese hesitated over the European approach. Although they ultimately hoped for a trilateral declaration, they decided to initiate bilateral talks with the EC. This was done because Tokyo began to suspect that the prospect of a trilateral declaration in the near future appeared slim. The Middle East crisis of 1973 seriously deteriorated the US-EC relationships. This put Japan in a difficult situation. In the end, the Americans ceased negotiations with the EC on a US-EC declaration. This meant that there was no possibility to forge a US-EC-Japan trilateral declaration in the future. Given such tense relations between the US and EC, an EC-Japan bilateral declaration would be regarded as an anti-American act. Thus, Japan could not explore this option. Tokyo quietly disengaged from the whole project of the Kissinger Exercise (including an EC-Japan bilateral declaration).