文章基本信息

标题：Refund Policy and Threat of Encroachment with Consumer Behaviors
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作者：Baoli Shi ; Qi Xu ; Zhongmiao Sun 等
期刊名称：IFAC PapersOnLine
印刷版ISSN：2405-8963
出版年度：2022
卷号：55
期号：10
页码：2360-2365
DOI：10.1016/j.ifacol.2022.10.061
语种：English
出版社：Elsevier
摘要：Pre-sale orders enable consumers to purchase products in advance, but they may lead to a high level of consumer returns. Based on consumer behaviors, this study builds a two-stage model comprising an incumbent retailer, a competitor, and strategic consumers under the competitive market or the monopoly market. A competitor has the option of entering and exiting the market during the regular sales period. We study the optimal pricing mechanism of both the incumbent and competitive retailer, analyze the impact of consumers’ choice strategies, competitors’ options on pricing decisions, and the incumbent retailer's performance. Our results imply that when the proportion of strategic consumers is large or consumers’ strategic behavior is strong, the competitor's revenue is high while the incumbent's revenue is low. However, a high proportion of loyal consumers and a flexible price strategy favor the incumbent retailer. And the entry of a competitor has a negative impact on the incumbent retailer.
关键词：pricing;threat of new competitors;pre-sale;consumer behavior;refund service