文章基本信息

标题：Dividend policy and earnings management: Do agency problem and financing constraints matter?
本地全文：下载
作者：Ammar Hussain ; Minhas Akbar
期刊名称：Borsa Istanbul Review
印刷版ISSN：2214-8450
出版年度：2022
卷号：22
期号：5
页码：839-853
语种：English
出版社：Elsevier B.V.
摘要：The present study aims to examine the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management by explicitly considering the role of the agency problem and financing constraints. The sample comprises 3250 non-financial Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2018. This study uses fixed- and random effect models as econometric techniques. Dividend policy is measured with dividend yield, payout ratio, large and small dividend payment status. Earnings management is measured with discretionary accruals, which are used as a proxy of accrual-based earnings management. The salient findings of the study are as follows: (1) overall, dividend payments restrict managers' involvement in earnings management practices; (2) compared with small dividend-paying firms, larger dividend-paying firms have less involvement in earnings management practices; (3) the agency problem does not affect the nature of the proposed relationship; (4) the dividend payments of non-financially constrained firms dampen managers’ opportunistic behavior toward earnings management practices and vice versa.
关键词：Dividend policy;Earnings management;Financing constraints