文章基本信息

标题：Worker Recruiting with Favoritism and Bribery
本地全文：下载
作者：Gen Chen 1,2 , Jun Tang
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2015
卷号：05
期号：03
页码：415-424
DOI：10.4236/tel.2015.53048
语种：English
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：This paper discusses the corruptive action widespread in the organizations’ worker recruiting: favoritism and bribery. The managers of the firm are actually able to discern the type of the productivity of the job-seekers, but they utilize the information advantage through the two types of misconduct—favoritism and bribery, at the expense of the profit share of the principal (the owner) and the workers’ wage rent. The key conclusion is drawn from this paper as follows: neither the intensity of favoritism nor the wage level matters in determining whether there’s profit or loss in the firm, whereas the key variable is the relative situation of exterior labor market.
关键词：Recruiting; Social Tie; Favoritism; Bribery