文章基本信息

标题：Directionally Bounded Utility and the Executive Pay Puzzle
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作者：Edoh Y. Amiran 1 , Daniel A. Hagen
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2015
卷号：05
期号：02
页码：238-245
DOI：10.4236/tel.2015.52028
语种：English
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：The pay of CEOs and other top executives has risen disproportionately relative to other earnings. We provide a supply-side explanation based on utility theory using directionally bounded utility functions. As overall income levels have grown, the amount of compensation required to induce top executives to sacrifice a quiet life has risen. We show that directionally bounded utility functions predict a general rise in compensation for stress. More importantly, such utility functions can be used to explain why the CEO pay ratio has risen at an increasing rate, something which other approaches have difficulty explaining.
关键词：Executive Pay; Utility Theory; Substitution Effects