文章基本信息

标题：Traffic Network Equilibria with Rational Expectations
本地全文：下载
作者：Kiyoshi KOBAYASHI ; Hirokazu TATANO
期刊名称：Interdisciplinary Information Sciences
印刷版ISSN：1340-9050
电子版ISSN：1347-6157
出版年度：1996
卷号：2
期号：2
页码：189-198
DOI：10.4036/iis.1996.189
出版社：The Editorial Committee of the Interdisciplinary Information Sciences
摘要：This paper provides with a new framework for traffic network equilibria with incomplete information. The basic element of our approach is differential information; different drivers have different information about their environment; they choose routes based on their private (differentiated) information. The purpose of this paper is to develop a general equilibrium model that makes explicit information or beliefs that a driver has as part of his/her primitive characteristics. The model we present is a reinterpretation on Harsanyi’s incomplete information game in a network game context. The difference from Harsanyi’s approach is the explicit consideration of rational expectations formation by drivers. A numerical illustration may provide us with a pedagogical insight on traffic network equilibria with incomplete information.
关键词：Rational expectations;Traffic network equilibria;Incomplete information