文章基本信息

标题：Externalities and the Magnitude of Cyber Security Underinvestment by Private Sector Firms: A Modification of the Gordon-Loeb Model
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作者：Lawrence A. Gordon 1 , Martin P. Loeb 1 , William Lucyshyn 2 , Lei Zhou
期刊名称：Journal of Information Security
印刷版ISSN：2153-1234
电子版ISSN：2153-1242
出版年度：2015
卷号：06
期号：01
页码：24-30
DOI：10.4236/jis.2015.61003
语种：English
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：Cyber security breaches inflict costs to consumers and businesses. The possibility also exists that a cyber security breach may shut down an entire critical infrastructure industry, putting a nation’s whole economy and national defense at risk. Hence, the issue of cyber security investment has risen to the top of the agenda of business and government executives. This paper examines how the existence of well-recognized externalities changes the maximum a firm should, from a social welfare perspective, invest in cyber security activities. By extending the cyber security investment model of Gordon and Loeb [1] to incorporate externalities, we show that the firm’s social optimal investment in cyber security increases by no more than 37% of the expected externality loss.
关键词：Economics of Information Security; Cyber Security Investment