文章基本信息

标题：Why Do People Pay for Useless Advice?
本地全文：下载
作者：Nattavudh Powdthavee ; Yohanes Riyanto
期刊名称：CEP Discussion Paper
出版年度：2012
卷号：2012
语种：English
出版社：Centre for Economic Performance
摘要：We investigated experimentally whether people can be induced to believe in a non-existent expert, and subsequently pay for what can only be described as transparently useless advice about future chance events. Consistent with the theoretical predictions made by Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010), we show empirically that the answer is yes and that the size of the error made systematically by people is large.
关键词：Behavioral finance;hot-hand;random streak;expertise;information