期刊名称:American Journal of Industrial and Business Management
印刷版ISSN:2164-5167
电子版ISSN:2164-5175
出版年度:2014
卷号:04
期号:07
页码:376-384
DOI:10.4236/ajibm.2014.47046
语种:English
出版社:Scientific Research Publishing
摘要:The paper establishes a supply chain coordinating model based on single 4PL-multy 3PL. Considering goods loss and damage, it comes to the conclusion that the fixed revenue-sharing contract couldn't be coordination when the yields was relative to the efforts of 3PL and 4PL. In order to get the coordination, we first model a fixed revenue-sharing contract based on side payment using L-F model and the theory of principal-agent on the premise of symmetric information. Then, we analyze the application of this model when the information is asymmetric. The result shows that the symmetric model can get the coordinating while the optimal efforts of asymmetric information model depend on the 3PL’s performance. At last, we check the analysis using a traditional sample.
关键词:Fixed Revenue-Sharing Contract; Side Payment; 3PL Coordination; Principal-Agent Model; L-F Game Theory