文章基本信息

标题：Stability and Equilibrium Selection in Learning Models: A Note of Caution
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作者：YiLi Chien ; YiLi Chien ; In-Koo Cho 等
期刊名称：Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review
印刷版ISSN：0014-9187
出版年度：2021
卷号：103
期号：4
DOI：10.20955/r.103.477-88
语种：English
出版社：Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
摘要：Relative to rational expectations models, learning models provide a theory of expectation formation where agents use observed data and a learning rule. Given the possibility of multiple equilibria under rational expectations, the learning literature often uses stability as a criterion to select an equilibrium. This article uses a monetary economy to illustrate that equilibrium selection based on stability is sensitive to specifications of the learning rule. The stability criterion selects qualitatively different equilibria even when the differences in learning specifications are small.