文章基本信息

标题：The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Commitment of Managers in an IPO Setting: Evidence from Korean Small and Venture Firms
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作者：Youngjoo Lee
期刊名称：Sustainability
印刷版ISSN：2071-1050
出版年度：2022
卷号：14
期号：2
页码：730
DOI：10.3390/su14020730
语种：English
出版社：MDPI, Open Access Journal
摘要：Managers’ commitment and dedication crucially affect the sustainable growth of firms. When private companies first offer their shares to the public in an initial public offering (IPO), an IPO lockup is one way of revealing managers’ commitments. IPO lockups are agreements that promise not to sell the shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders for a specified period in the market after the IPO. This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the length of the lockup period. The paper’s sample consists of IPO firms that have gone public in Korea’s KOSDAQ market, which is a listing venue for small and venture companies. The major findings of this paper are as follows: first, the length of the lockup period increases with the number of outside directors and, second, IPO firms with audit committees have longer lockup periods than those without them. These results indicate that managers of firms with greater board independence choose a longer lockup period when going public. This paper also finds that the lockup period is positively related to the presence of venture capitalists serving as directors of IPO firms, which suggests that venture capital directors may ensure that managers have longer lockups. Overall, these findings suggest that, when small and venture companies go public, managers may use the IPO lockup as a commitment device that complements corporate governance mechanisms in reducing investor concern about the moral hazard problem of managers.