文章基本信息

标题：Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric social interactions
本地全文：下载
作者：Qi Su ; Benjamin Allen ; Joshua B. Plotkin 等
期刊名称：Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN：0027-8424
电子版ISSN：1091-6490
出版年度：2022
卷号：119
期号：1
DOI：10.1073/pnas.2113468118
语种：English
出版社：The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要：Significance Humans have a remarkable, but not ubiquitous, tendency toward altruism. This behavior reflects a classic enigma in evolutionary theory: When and why would individuals forgo selfish interests to help strangers? Population structure is known to catalyze cooperation because it enables local reciprocity—I help you, and you help me. But this explanation assumes bidirectional social interactions, whereas human interactions are often unidirectional: One individual has the opportunity to contribute altruistically to another, but not conversely. Here we uncover a surprising result, that directionality can actually facilitate cooperation. We study this effect theoretically and also in empirical social networks. We suggest several practical implications, including how to modify the directions of social interactions to promote cooperation. How cooperation emerges in human societies is both an evolutionary enigma and a practical problem with tangible implications for societal health. Population structure has long been recognized as a catalyst for cooperation because local interactions facilitate reciprocity. Analysis of population structure typically assumes bidirectional social interactions. But human social interactions are often unidirectional—where one individual has the opportunity to contribute altruistically to another, but not conversely—as the result of organizational hierarchies, social stratification, popularity effects, and endogenous mechanisms of network growth. Here we expand the theory of cooperation in structured populations to account for both uni- and bidirectional social interactions. Even though unidirectional interactions remove the opportunity for reciprocity, we find that cooperation can nonetheless be favored in directed social networks and that cooperation is provably maximized for networks with an intermediate proportion of unidirectional interactions, as observed in many empirical settings. We also identify two simple structural motifs that allow efficient modification of interaction directions to promote cooperation by orders of magnitude. We discuss how our results relate to the concepts of generalized and indirect reciprocity.
关键词：encooperationevolutionary game theoryasymmetric relationshipsdirected graphs