摘要:The sustainable cooperation of innovation in industrial parks is of great significance to the sustainable development of enterprises and parks. Factors explaining enterprise innovation cooperation activities in industrial parks have attracted great attention in scholarly research. In this article, a preference-based snowdrift game model on complex networks is proposed, where different combinations of enterprise reciprocity and risk preferences are introduced into the game model. The impact of these preferences on the sustainability of cooperation in mature and less-mature parks, characterized by different network styles, is examined through simulations. The investigation reveals that reciprocity and risk preferences have an effect on the sustainable emergence of enterprise cooperation under the constraints of a loss-to-profit ratio of cooperation, network average degree, and network style. Reciprocity preferences of enterprises are shown to have a greater impact on the sustainable emergence of cooperation than risk preference in two types of parks. Additionally, this advantage is more significant in less-mature parks. The results show the positive relationships between combinations of risk aversion and reciprocity preferences and the emergence of cooperation from a long-term perspective. This study concludes with a discussion of management suggestions and policy implications. The findings shed light on the understanding of the sustainable emergence of innovation cooperation in industrial parks.