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标题：Communication with forgetful liars
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作者：Philippe Jehiel
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2021
卷号：16
期号：2
页码：605-638
DOI：10.3982/TE4154
语种：English
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：I consider multiround cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium distribution of lies aggregated over all possible realizations of the states. The approach is used to shed light on when the full truth is almost surely elicited, and when multiple lies can arise in equilibrium. Elaborations are proposed to shed light on why nontrivial communication protocols are used in criminal investigations.
关键词：Forgetful liars; lie detection; analogy‐based expectations; cheap talk; C72; D82;