文章基本信息

标题：Approval voting without ballot restrictions
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作者：Federica Ceron ; Stéphane Gonzalez
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2021
卷号：16
期号：3
页码：759-775
DOI：10.3982/TE4087
语种：English
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：We axiomatically study voting rules without making any assumption on the ballots that voters are allowed to cast. In this setting, we characterize the family of “endorsement rules,” which includes approval voting and the plurality rule, via the imposition of three normative conditions. The first condition is the well known social‐theoretic principle ofconsistency ; the second one,unbiasedness , roughly requires social outcomes not to be biased toward particular candidates or voters; the last one, dubbedno single voter overrides , demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the social outcome. Building on this result, we provide the first axiomatic characterization of approval voting without the approval balloting assumption. The informational basis of approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of conditions that can be defined on most of the ballot spaces studied in the literature.
关键词：Approval voting; balloting procedures; informational basis; endorsement; D71;