文章基本信息

标题：Reference‐dependent preferences, time inconsistency, and pay‐as‐you‐go pensions
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作者：Torben M. Andersen ; Joydeep Bhattacharya ; Qing Liu 等
期刊名称：Economic Inquiry
印刷版ISSN：0095-2583
出版年度：2021
卷号：59
期号：3
页码：1008-1030
DOI：10.1111/ecin.12972
语种：English
出版社：Western Economic Association International
摘要：The classic Aaron–Samuelson result argues that pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) pension schemes cannot coexist with higher‐return, private, retirement‐saving schemes. The ensuing literature shows if agents voluntarily undersave for retirement due to myopia or time‐inconsistency, then a paternalistic, rationale for PAYG pensions arises only if voluntary retirement saving is fully crowded out because of a binding borrowing constraint. This paper generalizes the discussion to the reference‐dependent utility setup of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) where undersaving happens naturally. No borrowing constraint is imposed. We show it is possible to offer a non‐paternalistic, welfare rationale for return‐dominated, PAYG pensions to coexist with private, retirement saving.