文章基本信息

标题：Route Selection Decision-Making in an Intermodal Transport Network Using Game Theory
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作者：Lucija Bukvić ; Jasmina Pašagić Škrinjar ; Borna Abramović 等
期刊名称：Sustainability
印刷版ISSN：2071-1050
出版年度：2021
卷号：13
期号：8
页码：4443
DOI：10.3390/su13084443
语种：English
出版社：MDPI, Open Access Journal
摘要：Traveling through a transport network, or ordering and delivering packets, involves fundamental decision-making processes which can be approached by game theory: Rather than simply choosing a route, individuals need to evaluate routes in the presence of the congestion resulting from the decisions made by themselves and everyone else. In this paper, a game theory model for resolving route choices in transport network graphs is used. In the process of doing this, discovering a rather unexpected result known as Braess’s paradox, which shows that adding capacity to a network can sometimes actually cause congestion and an increase in transport costs. The decisions are made by non-cooperative players in a game theory environment known as prisoner’s dilemma. These methods are used to analyze routing problems by competing logistics operators on the transport network consisting of three Eastern Adriatic ports and an intermodal terminal in Budapest. The congestion game can be used in route selection regarding a decrease in transport costs for the carriers who are considered as rational players choosing the most sustainable solution.