文章基本信息

标题：Institutional shareholding as a corporate governance mechanism that drives Chief Executive Officer pay
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作者：María Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez ; Carlos Chiva-Ortells
期刊名称：BRQ Business Research Quarterly
印刷版ISSN：2340-9436
出版年度：2020
卷号：23
期号：3
页码：217-233
DOI：10.1177/2340944420941462
语种：English
出版社：Elsevier
摘要：We explore the effect of institutional directors on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay (total, fixed, and variable compensation). We delve particularly into the impact of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors, who, respectively, represent institutional investors who maintain and investors who do not maintain a business relationship with the firm whose board they serve on. Focusing on CEO total pay, the findings show that institutional and pressure-resistant directors on boards behave similarly, affecting CEO total pay in a nonlinear way: as the presence of institutional and pressure-resistant directors on boards increases, the monitoring hypothesis prevails, and subsequently, better corporate governance decreases CEO total pay. However, when their presence on boards exceeds a critical point, the entrenchment hypothesis holds, thereby leading to an increase in CEO total pay. Contrary to our predictions, pressure-sensitive directors do not affect CEO total pay. Regarding the CEO’s compensation structure (fixed and variable), the results suggest that institutional and pressure-resistant directors increase fixed compensation and reduce variable pay, while pressure-sensitive directors affect neither fixed nor variable compensation. This evidence supports the view that institutional directors should be considered as a heterogeneous collective.
关键词：CEO pay; Institutional directors; pressure-resistant; pressure-sensitive