文章基本信息

标题：Board of Directors’ Remuneration, Employee Costs, and Layoffs: Evidence from Spain
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作者：Mariano González-Sánchez ; Eva M. Ibáñez Jiménez ; Ana I. Segovia San Juan 等
期刊名称：Sustainability
印刷版ISSN：2071-1050
出版年度：2021
卷号：13
期号：14
页码：7518
DOI：10.3390/su13147518
语种：English
出版社：MDPI, Open Access Journal
摘要：Most of the empirical studies on board remuneration have focused on finding explanatory performance measures. There are studies that analyze if the compensation contracts of directors reward managers in such a way that they strive to maximize firm performance and shareholders’ wealth; however, there are few studies on the social aspect of corporate governance, or agent–employee and principal–employee relationships. Thus, in this study, our aim is to test whether there is a causal relationship between the remuneration of the board of directors of listed companies and the personnel policies of the companies, expressed through the cost of personnel and layoffs. For that, we used a sample of Spanish listed companies, and we found that two performance measures (return on equity and earnings per share on market price) have a greater effect on the growth rate of board remuneration when layoffs occur. Additionally, we found that the sales revenue and cash flow on total assets subsequently influenced personnel management.