文章基本信息

标题：AUCTIONS WITH LEAKS ABOUT EARLY BIDS: ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL BEHAVIOR
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作者：Sven Fischer ; Werner Güth ; Todd R. Kaplan 等
期刊名称：Economic Inquiry
印刷版ISSN：0095-2583
出版年度：2021
卷号：59
期号：2
页码：722-739
DOI：10.1111/ecin.12953
语种：English
出版社：Western Economic Association International
摘要：In sequential first‐ and second‐price private value auctions, second movers are informed about the first movers' bid with commonly known probability. Equilibrium bidding in first‐price auctions is mostly unaffected, but there are multiple equilibria in second‐price auctions affecting comparative statics across price rules. We show experimentally that informational leaks in first‐price auctions qualitatively confirm the theoretical predictions. In second‐price auctions, we analyze and experimentally confirm the existence of focal equilibria, and provide evidence for individual consistency in equilibrium selection.(JELD44, C72, C91)