文章基本信息

标题：Evolution of a Population of Selfish Agents on a Network ⁎
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作者：Nirabhra Mandal ; Pavankumar Tallapragada
期刊名称：IFAC PapersOnLine
印刷版ISSN：2405-8963
出版年度：2020
卷号：53
期号：2
页码：3385-3390
DOI：10.1016/j.ifacol.2020.12.1504
语种：English
出版社：Elsevier
摘要：AbstractIn this work, we consider a population composed of a continuum of agents that seek to selfishly minimize a cost function by moving on a network. The nodes in the network may represent physical locations or abstract choices. Taking inspiration from how water distributes itself in a system of connected tanks of varying heights, we formulate a best response dynamics for the population. In this dynamics, the population in each node simultaneously seeks to redistribute itself according to the ‘best response’ to the state of the population in the node’s neighborhood. We provide an algorithm to determine the best response as a function of the state of the population. We then show that given the state of the population, the best response is unique. For the continuous time version of the best response dynamics, we show asymptotic convergence to an equilibrium point for an arbitrary initial condition. We then explore a second dynamics, in which the population evolves according to centralized gradient descent of the social cost. Again, we show asymptotic convergence for an arbitrary initial condition. We illustrate our results through simulations.
关键词：KeywordsMulti-agent systemspopulation dynamicsbest response dynamicsevolution on networks