文章基本信息

标题：A Scalar-Parameterized Mechanism For Two-Sided Markets
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作者：Mariola Ndrio ; Khaled Alshehri ; Subhonmesh Bose 等
期刊名称：IFAC PapersOnLine
印刷版ISSN：2405-8963
出版年度：2020
卷号：53
期号：2
页码：16952-16957
DOI：10.1016/j.ifacol.2020.12.1241
语种：English
出版社：Elsevier
摘要：AbstractWe consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable mathematical properties with the most prominent being bounded efficiency loss and price markup under strategic interactions. Our model incorporates production capacity constraints and minimum inelastic demand requirements. Under perfect competition, the market mechanism yields allocations that maximize social welfare. When market participants are price-anticipating, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and provide an efficient way to compute the resulting market allocation. Moreover, we explicitly characterize the bounds on the welfare loss and prices observed at the Nash equilibrium.
关键词：KeywordsScalar-Parameterized Offers/BidsGame TheoryMarket EfficiencyNash Equilibrium