文章基本信息

标题：Regulation as Delegation
本地全文：下载
作者：Bar-Gill, Oren ; Sunstein, Cass R.
期刊名称：Journal of Legal Analysis
印刷版ISSN：2161-7201
电子版ISSN：1946-5319
出版年度：2015
卷号：7
期号：1
页码：1-36
DOI：10.1093/jla/lav005
出版社：Oxford University Press
摘要：In diverse areas—from retirement savings, to fuel economy, to prescription drugs, to consumer credit, to food and beverage consumption—government makes personal decisions for us or helps us make what it sees as better decisions. In other words, government serves as our agent. Understood in light of Principal-Agent Theory and Behavioral Principal-Agent Theory, a great deal of modern regulation can be helpfully evaluated as a hypothetical delegation. Shifting from personal decisions to public goods problems, we introduce the idea of reverse delegation, with the government as principal and the individuals as agents.