文章基本信息

标题：Learning by matching
本地全文：下载
作者：Yi‐Chun Chen ; Gaoji Hu
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2020
卷号：15
期号：1
页码：29-56
DOI：10.3982/TE3088
语种：English
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by partitions over possible worker type profiles. With this firm‐specific information, we propose a stability notion which, in addition to requiring individual rationality and no blocking pairs, captures the idea that the absence of rematching conveys no further information. When an allocation is not stable under the status quo information structure, a new pair of an allocation and an information structure will be derived. We show that starting from an arbitrary allocation and an arbitrary information structure, the process of allowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to rematch, accompanied by information updating, will converge with probability one to an allocation that is stable under the updated information structure. Our results are robust with respect to various alternative learning patterns.
关键词：Two-sided matching; incomplete information; stability; learning-blocking path; convergence